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WALTER NELLES
AN INTRANSIGENCY of purpose and keenness of analysis char-
acterized all that Professor Walter Nelles did. He gave his best
to the law, first as a participant in the struggle to protect civil
liberties, later as a scholar in the field of legal history. But while
we respected him for his ability, we loved him for his goodness
and his understanding. In his death we mourn the loss of a friend.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND THE CHANDLER BILL
THE NOTORIOUS paucity of dividends ordinarily distributed to creditors
upon liquidation in bankruptcy' has provoked vide comment and a growing
movement for reform. It has long been felt that the Bankruptcy Act- has
1. The dividends distributed to general creditors have long averaged less than
8% of liabilities. See REPs. Ar'y GEN. (1926-1935).
2. For the best short discussion of bankruptcy and insolvency in all their aspects,
see Douglas, Bankruptcy (1930) 2 ENcYc. Soc. Scmcs 449. On bankruptcy history
and comparative legislation, see references cited id. at 454. See in addition, S=- Gar -
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failed to minimize the total losses suffered by the general creditor body,3
although it may have succeeded in providing adequate relief for honest debt-
ors.4  Numerous investigations and reports, instituted to discover the defi-
ciencies of bankruptcy, culminated in the preparation of the Hastings-
Michener Bill of 1932, which embodied rather drastic revisions of the existing
bankruptcy law.5 Although that bill was buried in committee, it furnished
the impetus for the formation of the National Bankruptcy Conference, an
organization composed principally of lawyers, referees, and credit men, which
constituted itself to prepare a substitute measure." The product of the Con-
ference, incorporating many major and minor amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, was finally introduced as the Chandler Bill in the last session of Con-
gress and reintroduced in substantially similar form in the current session.7
NING OF PROCEDURE IX TIE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. SEN. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932) (report of the Attorney General on Bankruptcy Law and Practice), at 49,
hereinafter cited as STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE; DONOVAN, ADM.IINISTRATION OF
BANKRUI'T ESTATES (1931) 146 (Canada), 169 (England); WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) ; Brown, Comparative Legislation in Bankruptcy (1900)
2 J. Soc. CoSip. LEG. 251; Levinthal. The Early History of English Bankruptcy (1919)
67 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1. For a brief description of the bankruptcy systems of twenty
countries, see (1931) 5 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. passim.
3. This purpose includes within its scope equality of distribution. See Glenn,
A Study in the Development of Creditors' Rights (1914) 14 COL L. REV. 279, 369, 491;
McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act (1927) 40 HARV. L. REV. 341, 358.
It is by no means certain, however, that pro rata distribution on a percentage basis is
desirable. Sturges, .4 Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1055; note
203. inra: cl. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law (1918) 66 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 223. 234.
4. STR EXGTENING OF PROCEDCRE. op. cit. supra note 2, at xi. It is now generally
conceded that the bankruptcy law serves a vital function although repeal measures are
persistently introduced. Rogers, The Bankruptcy Act-And Suggested Changes (1925)
2 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 118, 126: Wolfe. The Bankruptcy Law and Its Econonic
Necessity (1930) 4 TEMP. L. Q. 218. Dissatisfaction with bankruptcy statutes is by
no means localized. See (1936) 5 So. AFR. L. T. 128 (new South African statute).
5. The Hastings-Michener Bill, S. 3866. H. R. 9968, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), is
exhaustively analyzed in STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 68.
The most important investigations were those conducted by the Solicitor General
[STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, supra], by Colonel William J. Donovan [DONOVAN,
ADM.NtISTRATION OF BANKRUPT ESTATES (1931)] and by the Yale Law School and the
Department of Commerce. For a list of earlier investigations and reports, see Clark,
Reform in Bankruptcy Administration (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1188, 1191, n. 9.
6. The history of the Conference is outlined in McLaughlin, Aspects of the
Chandler Bill to Amnend the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 369; Com-
mittee Print, H. R. 12889, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936), preface. The experience of the
Conference demonstrates that a permanent organization is necessary to foster thorough-
going reform. See Clark. supra note 5, at 1215.
7. H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). After four years work, the Bill was
introduced in the 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) as H.R. 10382 and later as H. R. 12889.
For the published drafts and suggestions on which the first draft was based, see Hastings-
*Michener Bill, supra note 5; Hunt. Inprovement of Bankruptcy Administration (1931-
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The Chandler Bill attempts to decrease creditor's losses in various ways:
by preventing failures initially; by shortening the critical period-that period
of asset dissipation and liability accumulation between the time a debtor first
experiences trouble in meeting his obligations and the time he invokes the
aid of some part of the machinery society has provided for resolving his
difficulties--either by making it easier for creditors to force a debtor into
bankruptcy, or by offering a debtor positive inducements to avail himself of
some voluntary proceeding ;8 by realizing more from a debtor's assets through
sale of assets brought into bankruptcy at highest prices, recovery of those
not brought into bankruptcy and resort to a debtor's future earnings; and
by securing a more efficient and economical administrative and liquidating
machinery.
The proposals made by the Chandler Bill may roughly be divided into two
classes: those which set up or perfect devices, such as compositions and ex-
tensions, assignments, and amortization by wage earners, designed to obviate
liquidation through standard bankruptcy proceedings, and those which aim to
increase dividends upon liquidation in bankruptcy. This Comment will con-
fine itself to an examination of some of the more important of these pro-
posals,9 considering how well they are designed to achieve their usual objective
32) 8 Am. BANxic. R V. 25, 57, 95. 124. 155, 371; Hunt, National Bankruptcy Legis-
lation-Past, Present and Future (1933) 38 Com.,t. L. J. 630; McLaughlin, supra note
3, at 341, 583; (1932) 8 Ams. BA.ar. REv. 388 (Weinstein draft) ; (1932) 7 J. N. A.
REF. BANKS. 3 (referees' proposals).
8. Ffirth, The Critical Period Before Banknptcy (1932) 41 YALr L. J. 853;
Legis. (1933) 33 CoL- L. REv. 704, 705, n. 6. The existence of the critical period
is substantiated by the fact that dividends in involuntary cases are higher than in
voluntary cases. REP. Arr'y GEN. (1932) 247; REP. Arrv GEN (1933) 143. This
discrepancy may be explained on the ground that all wage earner proceedings are
voluntary, and dividends in wage earner proceedings are notoriously lower than in
other cases. The simplest method of facilitating subjection of debtors to involuntary
bankruptcy is to adopt the equity definition of insolvency-inability to meet debts as
they mature. Even if this measure were politically practicable, its adoption might
result in forcing virtually solvent debtors into bankruptcy, particularly in times of
depression. For an analysis of financial statements and ratios to assist in a determina-
tion of business condition, see FrrzpARaca, SxToMs OF INDLuSTnAL FAnuna (1931).
9. It will not be possible to consider in this Comment various major proposals
made in the bill: § 5 (revised partnership section) ; § 12-I (corporate reorganizations),
somewhat similar provisions in H. R. 12889 discussed in Gerdes, Section 77B, The
Chandler Bill and Other Proposed Reivisions (1937) 35 Mica. L. Rev. 361; § 12-flM
(real property arrangements), discussed in Adams, Practice and Procedure under
Section 74 (1936) 11 J. N. A. REF. BAxxr. 45; old § 75 allowed to expire (agricultural
compositions - new Frazier-Lemke Act); repeal of old § 76 recommended. Various im-
portant provisions relating to preferences, fraudulent conveyances and kindred topics are
discussed in McLaughlin, loc. cit. sipra note 6. See page 1204 infra, for a consideration
of some preference amendments. Nor can the valuable improvements in draftsmanship
be here considered. See McLaughlin, supra at 377, n. 8. The excellent notes in the
Committee Print, supra note 6, should also be consulted.
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of increasing dividends to creditors, and whether the social cost of achieving
that objective is too great.
SUBSTITUTES FOR BANKRUPTCY LIQUIDATION
Compositions and Extensions. Composition and extension agreements, by
the terms of which a debtor agrees in return for a release to pay his creditors
a certain percentage of their claims, are used primarily but not exclusively by
the small business man as substitutes for bankruptcy liquidation. Theoret-
ically a composition provides for immediate payment of a reduced amount
and an extension for deferred but full payment; actually, however, most
agreements combine features of both.10 The initial cash payment often
required by these settlements is usually financed by a loan or a sale of liquid
assets. A debtor enters into such an agreement in order to continue his busi-
ness freed from the stigma of bankruptcy. Creditors agree to these settle-
ments even though debtor retention of some assets is involved because they
hope to obtain higher dividends by avoiding a costly and destructive liquida-
tion and at the same time keel ) a customer in business.
1'
Since common law compositions bind only assenting creditors, statutory
sanction was given to settlements of this sort early in the nineteenth century.
12
The legislative evolution of composition procedure in the United States cul-
minated in Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, which, as amended, provides
that a petition may be filed before or after adjudication in a pending bank-
ruptcy proceeding and that agreements approved by a majority of creditors
and confirmed by the court are binding on all unsecured creditors. But Sec-
tion 12 has not been employed extensively primarily because of the cumber-
some procedure it sets up.13 An unsavory reputation has attached to compo-
sitions. moreover, as a result of the invocation of the dilatory procedure by
some debtors to avoid examination or to delay bankruptcy proceedings and of
the common practice of obtaining creditor approval by purchasing bona fide
10. Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 704, 705 n. 9.
11. BECKMAN, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTIcE (1924) 383
But cf. Joint Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on
S. s56 . 72d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1932) 729. Avoidance of liquidation is said to be par-
ticularly important in depression time. Kinnane, Some Aspects of Section 7,1 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1934) 9 NOTRE DAME LAwY. 291. Scaling down of debts in time
of depression allows repayment of "real" value. McKEOWN AND LANGELLUTIG, FEDERAL
DEBTOR RELIEF LAws (1935) iii.
12. For a history of the development of compositions, see Committee Print, op. cit.
supra note 6. at 36. On comparative composition legislation, see note 2, supra; Duns-
combe, Preventhe Compositions or Compositions That Will Forestall Bankruptcy
(1916) 20 CASE AND COMMENT 594, 596.
13. The cumbersome machinery is vividly described in DONOVAN, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 24, 114. Compositions represent only 1A% of all cases under the act and
only 5% of tutal cases of merchants and manufacturers. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE,
op. cit. stepra note 2, at 208. One-third of all compositions are in the New York City
vicinity [DoNOVAN, supra at 217], and the rest are concentrated in a few areas.
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claims at a discount, manufacturing fraudulent claims or buying off objecting
creditors.' 4 And debtors occasionally find it unnecessary to invoke Section 12,
since they are usually able to effect what is virtually a composition by obtain-
ing court approval to a purchase of their property at a private bankruptcy
sale.
In the -hope of shortening the critical period and of preventing a greater
number of liquidations, Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act. passed in 1933,
attempted to widen the scope of relief available to individuals under com-
position procedure.' s An attempt was made to minimize the stigma of bank-
ruptcy compositions by permitting debtors, insolvent or unable to meet their
debts as they matured, to submit a plan of settlement in an original petition
independent of any bankruptcy proceeding, as well as an answer in a pending
proceeding before adjudication, and by making the provisions for granting a
stay of liquidation or adjudication more liberal. The permissible scope of a
plan was broadened and the extension of secured claims with creditor and
court approval was sanctioned. A later amendment appears to have made
creditor approval of any extension agreement unnecessary.10 Protection
against attachment of a debtor's property by non-assenting creditors during
the pendency of extension agreements was afforded by providing for reten-
tion of jurisdiction by the court after confirmation of a plan. To expedite
procedure Section 74 gave the referee original jurisdiction over proceedings
and the court exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and his property wherever
located. Although it is contended that the section has been of no practical
value to debtors, it has been used without handicap and with positive benefits
in a number of ordinary composition cases; it has made possible for the first
time under the Bankruptcy Act the working out of wage earner amortization
plans and real property reorganizations by individuals; it has even, some
have suggested, revitalized proceedings under Section 12.l 1
14. See DoNovAx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 114.
15. Discussions of § 74 are cited in Comment (1934) 43 YALu L. J. 1285, n. 3;
see also McKEowN AND LANGELLUTiG, loc. cit. supra note 11; (1933) 18 IoWA L. REv.
537. Section 74 was intended to supersede § 12. The clause repealing § 12 was deleted
in a last minute legislative flurry because corporations were inadvertently excluded
from the benefits of § 74.
16. 48 STAT. 922, 11 U. S. C. § 202(e) (1934). While the proponents of § 74 believed
that they were providing for extension agreements for the first time, such agreements
were consummated under § 12. Legis. (1933) 33 CoL- L. Rzv. 704, 705. But cf. Gar-
rison, The New Bankruptcy Amendments: Sornc Problems of Construction (1933)
8 Wis. L. Rzv. 289, 295. Creditors will generally consent more readily to extension
agreements than to composition agreements. Legis. (1933) 33 COL L Ray. 704, 718.
17. Comment, A Survey of Sections 74 and 75 of the Bankruptcy Act in Actual
Operation (1934) 43 YAz L. J. 1285; (1935) 10 J. N. A. REF. BA.m=. 66. In the
Southern District of New York there have been 171 cases since the enactment of § 74
in March, 1933. Communication to the YALE LAW JOU NAL from Referee Peter B.
Olney, Jr., referee in the Southern District of New York, March 2, 1937. Pessimistic
predictions that § 74 was unsound, ambiguous, unworkable, and unnecessary seem to
have been grounded on an overstrict interpretation of a poorly drafted statute.
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The Arrangement Subsection of the Chandler Bill, which supersedes Sec-
tions 12 and 74, carries still further the objectives of the latter Section. Both
corporations and individuals are allowed to propose a plan after as well as
before adjudication.' 8 The scope of a plan is extended to include not only
those provisions allowed 1y Section 74, but any other appropriate terms, in-
cluding those commonly used in out-of-court extension and reorganization
agreements. A plan may call for any consideration and may provide for
division of unsecured creditors into classes; rejection of executory contracts,
including leases: continuation of the debtor's business with or without creditor
or other supervision; termination of an extension under specified conditions;
allowance of priority to debts incurred during the pendency of an arrange-
ment: retention of jurisdiction by the court; and any other appropriate terms
consistent with the Subsection. A proposal, on the other hand, may not affect
secured claims.10 The bill attempts to preserve the interests of creditors by
re-enacting, in effect, Section 74m, which required an assignee or court offi-
cial whenever appointed to account ;2" by vesting the officers of the court with
the usual bankruptcy powers ;21 by tolling Statutes of Limitation and the
four months' period for the running of preferences ;22 and by speeding up
proceedings to some extent.2 3 Upon approval by a majority of creditors and
deposit of consideration, priority claims, and costs, the court is to confirm
an arrangement if satisfied that it is equitable, feasible and for the best inter-
ests of creditors; court approval is unnecessary when all creditors have
accepted.2 4 A stay of adjudication is to be granted only when security has
been pos'ed against diminution,2-- and the debtor is to be examined in every
case. -02 If a plan fails of creditor acceptance, court confirmation, or final
consummation, the court is given power to adjudicate the debtor, although
the court may extend for cause the time of payment to cure a default.-"
The Arrangement Subsection should be of value to both corporate and
individual debtors. Some of the smaller corporations now seeking relief
under Section 77B may be induced to utilize the simpler machinery proposed
by this Subsection, especially since a plan may provide for the formation of
a new company and the issuance of new securities. Compositions and exten-
sions by individuals, besides being made available to those who already have





23. E.g., §12-Ie(2) (assent to modified proposal); 12-Id(3) (e) (3) (time for
filing application for confirmation).
24. § 12-Ic; § 12-Id (3) (e) (2). Deposit of priority claims may be waived. § 12-Id
(3) (e) (2).
25. § 12-Ib(3). Where an original petition is filed, a requirement of security rests
within the discretion of the court.
26. § 12-Id(3) (c).
27. § 12-Ie(7),(8).
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been adjudicated bankrupts, will probably operate more effectively, although
many of the "new" devices proposed by the bill have doubtless been pre-
viously employed. A division of creditors into classes will make possible, for
example, payment to a bank of a higher percentage of an old claim than is
paid to merchandise creditors, in order to obtain a loan to finance the com-
position. And new credit may be more easily secured during the operation
of a business under an extension agreement by granting priority to new
debts. 28
The usefulness of the Section is restricted, however, by the omission of
secured claims from its purview. While it is not constitutionally possible to
scale down secured claims, it is permissible to extend them within certain
limits.29 Even if the Arrangement Subsection empowered a majority of cred-
itors to bind secured creditors to an extension agreement, little assistance
would be given debtors in retaining their homes or farms, since a secured
creditor, whose claim often comprises more than half of a debtor's total
obligations, will be able to block a proposal affecting his rights. To provide
for such cases, it is necessary to retain the provisions of Section 74 vesting
courts with power to confirm extension agreements without creditor con-
sent.30 And if unsecured creditors are to be granted full relief, power to
confirm all proposals affecting their rights without creditor approval should
be granted to the court. On the other hand, if minority creditors and debtors
forced by creditor pressure to accept unconscionable terms are to be pro-
tected, it seems wise to ignore suggestions that court confirmation be dispensed
with where a large proportion of creditors approve an agreement.3
In several other respects the Arrangement Subsection is not designed to
attract debtors. The requirement that costs and priority claims be immedi-
ately paid or deposited may often impose a prohibitive burden on a small
business man seeking an extension.32 Nor will debtors be induced to come
to terms early in the hope of being spared from the stigma of bankruptcy
by the provisions allowing the court to adjudicate a debtor when a plan fails
28. It is specifically provided also that confirmation of a composition operates as a
discharge. § 12-Ie(6). See note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 439.
29. Compare Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke,
57 Sup. Ct. 556 (1937), with Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555 (1935). See also Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 651; NNAR=m. BAN;Knu "rcy m
UNrrED STAins HISTORY (1935) 9.
30. Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1285, 1292. A proposal writing in the amend-
ments of §75(s) to §74 was passed by the Senate but not by the House. (1935)
11 J. N. A. REF. BAwKR. 7.
31. See Yrnuoox (1924) (Ass'n of Bar of City of N. Y.) 282. But see (1914)
48 Ia. L. T. 81. Such a provision would not limit the utility of the Arrangement Sub-
section because court consent is withheld only in unusual circumstances.
32. For possible procedural amendments, see Joint Hearings, sispra note 11, at
524. And retention of jurisdiction should have been made mandatory rather than
permissive in order to insure against attachment during the pendency of an emtension
arrangement.
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of acceptance, confirmation, or consummation; making the posting of security
against diminution a condition precedent to the granting of a stay of adjudi-
cation ;33 and requiring an examination in every case. 34 The privileges of the
Section are justifiably extended to those who have already been adjudicated
bankrupt, although the stigma of arrangement proceedings may thereby be
infinitesimally increased.35
While the Chandler Bill is an improvement over Section 74 in many re-
spects, no proposal of its general character can lead to any great increase in
the use of bankruptcy compositions. Compositions might be encouraged
more successfully by strengthening the position of common law settlements,
generally conceded to be less formal, less expensive, and less stigmatized.
The Chandler Bill makes no efforts in that direction, other than to allow the
use of consents obtained prior to the institution of court proceedings. 30 The
Bankruptcy Act might well be amended to declare that a common law settle-
ment accepted by a majority of creditors operate to bind all creditors, pro-
vided that upon the petition of any creditor within a specified period after
notification of the consummation of the agreement, the bankruptcy court
would have the power to set the agreement aside for cause. 37 A supplementary
provision would allow a common law composition to supplant an attachment
or other collection proceeding.38 It also would be provided that subsequently
discovered preferences are recoverable and payable half to the discovering
creditor and pro rata to other creditors. 39 These provisions would encourage
debtors to seek common law settlements and would allow wider use of them
without depriving minority creditors of protection.
It may be questioned, however, whether it is sound policy to foster the use
of compositions. Most in-court and many out-of-court compositions and
extensions probably afford no more than transient relief. Even in the un-
usual case when relief is sought at an early stage of insolvency, the immediate
payment of cash required in many compositions is likely to make ultimate
33. See Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 704, n. 3, n. 5; Kinnane, supra note 11,
at 311.
34. Examination could be left to the discretion of the referee, or made mandatory
on the petition of 10% of creditors. See DoNovAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156
(Canadian provision).
35. Section 74 was confined to unadjudicated debtors for this reason. See Legis.
(1933) 33 Coi. L. REv. 704, 711. The Arrangement Subsection seeks to attract debtors
at too high a price when it seemingly allows them to bargain away their exemptions.
But see Comment (1933) 18 ST. Louis L. Rav. 324, 328. Unlike § 74 the Arrange-
ment Section makes no specific provision for the setting aside of exemptions. The
Amortization Section of the bill contains a specific provision to that effect. § 12-IVf (4).
36. § 12-Id(3) (d).
37. A somewhat similar proposal is made in Comment (1933) 11 N. C. L. Ry. 310.
Composition statutes in Europe originally merely legalized out-of-court settlements.
Holm-Nielsen, An European View of the American Bankruptcy Act of March, 1933
(1933) 9 AAT. BANIKR. Ray. 310, 311.
38. Cf. Sturges. A Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1055.
39. Cf. Sturges, id. at 1079; Comment (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 310.
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failure a certainty by draining the business of working capital.O If this
difficulty can be overcome, an agreement is not likely to eliminate those varied
factors of inefficiency which usually make for business failure, except in the
rare case where competent creditor supervision is provided for.41 And it is
of doubtful wisdom to facilitate the operation of a process which assists in-
efficient units to remain in business.
42
Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors. Because of dissatisfaction with
bankruptcy machinery, commercial debtors have often effected liquidations
and carried out compositions and extensions by turning over their assets to
assignees.43 Although all creditors are barred from attaching property in
the hands of an assignee,44 fraudulent assignments are controlled by allowing
three non-consenting creditors to petition an assigning debtor into involuntary
bankruptcyP Assignments are otherwise unchecked except by regulatory
statutes in some states.4 These statutes usually provide for supervision over
the assignee, recovery of preferences and examination of the debtor, but it
is claimed that they are so cumbersome in their operation and so poorly en-
forced that they are of little service in preserving the rights of creditors.
47
40. Comment (1934) 43 Y.aE L J., 1285, 1292. Extension agreements are also
likely to fail unless substantial additions can be made to capital. Joint Hearings, supra
note 11, at 868.
41. See page 1186 infra. The Bill deletes the provision that a plan must make for
the financial rehabilitation of the debtor before the court will confirm it, but bestowal
of court approval will hardly be influenced by this omission.
42. See Comment (1934) 43 YAm. L. J. 1285, 1291. It has been suggested that
a staff of experts be set up to examine the social and economic justification for the
continuation of a particular business and to proceed with liquidation or rehabilitation
accordingly. See Cover, Buiness and Personal Failure and Rcadjustment in Chicago
(1933) 3 U. OF CL J. OF Bus. No. 3, 106. The Act itself recognizes that some
businesses may be socially more necessary than others when it exempts certain types
of corporations, such as railroads, from its operation.
43. Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules
of Marketing? (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 480. It is estimated that assignments are used
one-half as often as bankruptcy in the United States. STNGTHEN NG OF ProcznunE,
op. cit. mupra note 2, at 69.
44. See Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 603, 603.
45. § 3a(5) Bankruptcy Act. For discussions of what constitutes a "general assign-
ment," and of methods of avoiding the statutory definition, see Comment (1932) 41 Ym.
L. J. 1056; Legis. (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 705, n. 8; Joint Hearings, Mspra note 11, at
644. That assignments are often made for fraudulent purposes, see id. at 704, 22, 827.
46. For a classification of the provisions of state assignment statutes, see Legis.
(1933) 20 VA. L Rav. 222.
47. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 71; see also (1937)
15 N. C. L. REv. 267 (weakness of preference provisions of state statute). 'When the
assignment is made at common law, and not pursuant to statute, it may provide a
cheaper and more expeditious method than bankruptcy, but my experience, under the
New York Assignment Statute, is that the statutory proceeding is more cumbersome
and expensive and does not provide as complete and adequate safeguards as though it
were conducted under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Act." Communication to the
19371 1185
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And since state statutes generally do not provide for the setting aside of
exemptions and can not grant a discharge, the debtor's rights are not ade-
quately protected, for an assignment only releases him from claims held
by consenting creditors. 48
Honest assignees and assignments operate at a great disadvantage. As-
signees are constantly plagued by nuisance creditors or unscrupulous attor-
neys who threaten to institute bankruptcy proceedings if they are not bought
off. Indeed. assignees, unequipped with statutory powers, may themselves be
forced to seek bankruptcy.4 And a penniless debtor who wishes to obtain
a discharge from all his debts may be compelled to avail himself of the very
bankruptcy proceedings he had attempted to avoid. " 0
Despite these handicaps a number of assignments have operated success-
fully. Particularly significant are those conducted by the non-profit making
adjustment bureaus affiliated with the National Association of Credit Men.5'
These bureaus handle-sometimes with active creditor assistance-assign-
ments aimed at liquidation of a debtor's estate or the negotiation of compo-
sition agreements.52 Not infrequently the bureau will consummate an exten-
sion agreement under which it will supervise the operation of a business,
YALE LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 29, 1937, from W. Randolph Montgomery, General Counsel,
National Association of Credit Men. "The statutory provisions differ widely, however,
and in many jurisdictions it is possible to handle assignments even in the light of
statutory provisions, with more expedition and economy than attends bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. This is certainly not the case, however, in New York." Communication to
YALE LAW JOURNAL from W. Randolph Montgomery, Feb. 8, 1937. Bills amending
the assignment statute have been introduced in the New York State Legislature in
recent years. See. e. g., Assembly Bill No. 2064. Int. 1860 (1935).
48. State statutes granting a complete discharge are in conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act and invalid. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140. A state statute permitting a debtor to
make an assignment for the sole benefit of those creditors who grant him a release
is not in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (1933),
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140.
49. (1931) 5 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 170, 171; STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 69. It is often impossible to find three non-consenting creditors
who are willing to lend their names to a petition. Ibid.
50. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 69. The appointment
of someone other than the assignee as receiver is necessary in fraudulent assignments.
Some courts refuse to appoint even an honest and capable assignee as receiver, Joint
Hearings, supra note 11, at 800. The better practice is to decide whether or not to
allow the assignee to continue after an examination of each case on its merits, rather
than to establish a blanket rule. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Judge
John C. Knox, Jan. 15, 1937.
51. These bureaus are carefully supervised by the National Association of Credit
Men. On friendly adjustments in general, see Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Pica
for "Friendly Adjustment" (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 413; Billig, Extra Judicial Admin-
istration of Insolvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REV.
293; Douglas and Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some
Suggestions (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 25, 42.
52. An assignment is made to protect against attachment while the composition
agreement is being negotiated.
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eliminate management errors, and eventually, in many cases, return a business
to the owner with all debts paid.P By realizing more on assets, and by admin-
istering more efficiently and expeditiously,5 4 the skilled, permanent staffs of
adjustment bureaus, freed from technical procedural and legalistic limitations,
are able to conduct liquidations more successfully than bankruptcy adminis-
trators.
While the advantage of a competent personnel is limited for the most part
to adjustment bureaus or similar organizations, other benefits are shared alike
by all assignmentsY5 A debtor who makes a bona fide assignment is said to
carry a lesser stigma, to be able to negotiate a more favorable composition
or extension agreement and to be in a better position to secure credit in a
new business venture, than a debtor who avails himself of, or is forced into,
bankruptcy.56 These advantages, it is maintained, induce a debtor to come to
terms at an early stage of insolvency so that creditors profit by a shortening
of the critical period as well as by the retention of customers in business and
by an avoidance of publicity on credit losses. 7 The generally conceded supe-
riority of friendly adjustments to the present bankruptcy system 8 has fos-
tered occasional legislative attempts at protecting bona fide assignments.
If legislation dealing with assignments is not to destroy the out-of-court
atmosphere and freedom from legalistic restrictions which assignments enjoy,
assignments must be protected and implemented with statutory powers with-
out subjecting them to the dominion of a court. It is naturally difficult to
draft such a provision without losing control over fraudulent assignments.P
53. Although at common law continuation of a business makes an assignment
void against an attaching creditor [GLE.ENN, LQuniATxoi; (1935) § 112], assignments of
this character have been employed frequently and with conspicuous success. Some state
statutes confer specific authority to continue operation. Legis. (1933) 20 V,%. L REV.
222. A decision as to whether a business should be continued is often made by a
creditors' committee experienced in the business concerned.
54. For a list of some of the economies which can be effected by a large scale
liquidating organization, see p. 1198 infra. See also articles cited .inpra note 51. Ad-
justment bureaus charge a 10% fee for their services.
55. In some cases estates may be disposed of more expeditiously without invoking
the machinery of the adjustment bureaus. Comment (1932) 41 YALE L J. 603, 604.
56. See DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 153.
"The answer to this question (whether there is less of a stigma attached to pro-
ceedings under the Deeds of Arrangement Act than under the Bankruptcy Act) is in
the affirmative. English bankruptcy legislation involves a public examination into
conduct by the Court and publicity in the local press which is almost entirely absent
in the case of Deeds of Arrangement.' Communication to the YALE Lw JO~rf.lL
from the British Inspector General in Bankruptcy, March 1, 1937.
57. Critical period shorter: Ffirth, sutpra note 8, at 861; Donovan, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 162. Contra: Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 521. Publicity avoided: Cover,
.stpra note 42, at 88.
58. See articles cited note 51 sitpra. For a less adulatory appraisal of friendly
adjustments, see Ganer, On Comparing "Friendly Adjushnent" and B)anruptcy (1930)
16 Corn. L. Q. 35.
59. Friebolin, The Proposed Amendments to the Bankruplcy Law (1932) 37 Cons.
L. J. 564, 567; (1931) 5 J. N. A. REF. BANKPL 170, 172.
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The Hastings-Michener Bill provided that assignments to authorized trustees
filed in a court of bankruptcy would no longer be acts of bankruptcy. 0 The
assignees, replaceable by a majority vote of creditors at a meeting within five
days, were to be given the powers of a trustee and to be subjected to close
supervision by the court, and debtors were to be granted a discharge without
adjudication. That proposal, however, made assignments too completely an
in-court proceeding.,' Because of widespread lawyer opposition to "legali-
zation" of assignments, the draftsmen of the Chandler Bill made no overt pro-
vision for assignments, although they hoped by improving the operation of
the composition section to facilitate the conduct of those friendly adjust-
ments which terminated in compositions or creditor supervision of manage-
nient under an extension agreement.62 Since the Bill also allows the use of
consents obtained before the institution of the proceedings 3 and requires an
assignee to account to the court of bankruptcy, 6 4 it is expected that when
unanimous consent of creditors to an assignment can not be obtained, the
60. This provision is discussed in detail in STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 72. For a similar proposal, see Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51,
at 45. Assignments are legalized by statute in almost every country.
61. Some of the bureaus conducting adjustments objected to the proposal on this
ground. E.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 731. On the other hand the provision
met with the approval of W. Randolph Montgomery, general counsel for the National
Association of Credit Men. Joint Hearings, supra at 451; Montgomery, Bankruptcy's
New Broom (1932) 6 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 146. The provision was generally
approved by creditors. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra at 456, 697.
62. "There was wide-spread opposition to the provisions of the Hastings-Michener
Bill with respect to out of court assignments. The National Bankruptcy Conference
came to the conclusion that a better way out of the situation was to revise the com-
position section of the Bankruptcy Act (Section 12) to enable all those things to be
done in an "arrangement" proceeding under Section 12 which are now possible in
out of court assignments . . . We have attempted to make Section 12 as rewritten
sufficiently flexible to cover all practical situations." Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from W. Randolph Montgomery, general counsel for the National Association
of Credit Men, and member of the drafting committee of the National Bankruptcy
Conference, Jan. 8, 1937. Some lawyers cooperate fully with adjustment bureaus. Billig
and Billig, A Realistic Approach to the Study of Insolvency Law (1931) 16 COaN. L. Q.
542, 569.
63. § 12-Id(3) (d). "Sec. 12-1 expressly provides that consents may be obtained
before the institution of a proceeding. This was written into the bill, at my suggestion,
for the very purpose of strengthening the position of the creditors in out-of-court pro-
ceedings." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from W. Randolph Montgomery,
Jan. 29, 1937.
64. § 2a (21); §70a (8). The only other provision of the bill which affects assign-
ments makes it simpler to throw assignments into bankruptcy by providing that estopped
creditors shall not be counted in determining whether there are fewer than 12 creditors
of the bankrupt. § 59e (3). In such cases one creditor rather than the customary three
can file a petition. For a suggested amendment to the contrary, see Joint Hearings,
supra note 11, at 764. Contrast the suggestion that creditors who consent to an assign-
ment be permitted to file a petition. Olmstead, The Development of the Bankruptcy
Laws (1924) 1 Amr. BANKR. Rzv. 151, 153.
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necessary papers will be prepared and either actually filed or held ready for
filing at a moment's notice under the new Arrangement Subsection.c But con-
sents, once secured, can in most cases be obtained again; and although a re-
quirement that an assignee account is likely to furnish more adequate control
over unscrupulous assignees, it is hardly calculated to induce adjustment
bureaus to avail themselves freely of the Arrangement Subsection. And since
the somewhat broader scope and the simplified procedure of the proposed
Subsection do not seem to provide advantages substantial enough to induce
bureaus, which have hesitated to use Section 74, to submit to court control,
nuisance creditors are hardly likely to be curbed by the proposed bill. Even
if adjustment bureaus feel no compunction about filing under the Arrange-
ment Subsection, it is probable that those referees who view all assignments
with suspicion, and friendly adjustments with antagonism,C" may refuse to
confirm proposals providing for supervision by an adjustment bureau, since
the Bill does not specifically refer to plans of that character. And in any
event, even if the Chandler Bill attained its objectives in this respect, it would
not assist the large number of friendly adjustments which are made in order
to liquidate a debtor's estate out of court.
It is suggested that the only way to steer between court control of friendly
adjustments and lack of supervision over fraudulent assignments is to deprive
minority creditors of power to throw into bankruptcy any assignment ap-
proved by a majority of creditors which carries provisions preserving to a
debtor his exemptions and releasing him from all his obligations. Safeguards
would be erected by clothing referees with discretionary power to place an
assignment in bankruptcy or to appoint, with debtor and majority creditor
approval, a new assignee or make other appropriate orders, upon the petition
within four months of any creditor or of any assignee.P It might also be
provided that an assignee who filed an assignment with the approval of a
majority of creditors could be given the powers of a trustee, if the referee
approved.68 And while the exercise of the discretion of a minority of referees
may be influenced by antagonism towards assignments and interest in bring-
ing assignments into bankruptcy, that danger can be guarded against to some
extent by a legislative policy declaration in favor of legitimate assignments
and by supplanting the fee system of compensation for referees with a salary
system. Threats by nuisance creditors to bring bankruptcy actions would
then be of little concern to bona fide assignments since such actions would
be doomed to failure.
65. Communications to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from V. Randolph Montgomery,
Jan. 8, 29, 1937.
66. See Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51, at 43; Joint Hearings, supra note
11, at 687; (1931) 5 J. N. A. R~r. BAam. 170, 172; Comment (1932) 38 W. VA. L
Rav. 352 (disqualification of bureaus as bankruptcy trustees) ; (1936) 10 J. N. A. Rrr.
BAwKR. 94.
67. Compare the suggestion that assignments be made acts of bankruptcy only when
a majority of creditors have not approved. Joint Hearings, mipra note 11, at 702.
68. Cf. Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51, at 47.
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This provision would set up a uniform assignment system 9 and in all likeli-
hood would eliminate most of the disadvantages under which assignments now
labor without destroying the desirable out-of-court atmosphere. And since
consent of a majority of creditors would be required, assignments would
not be likely to acquire a new stigma by being completely substituted for
voluntary bankruptcy in commercial cases.
70
Wage Earner Amorti-vation. While the Bankruptcy Act allows a wage
earner to obtain a discharge from all his debts in a voluntary proceeding and
protects him, when he earns less than $1.500 a year or owes less than $1,000,
from subjection to involuntary bankruptcy. 71 no proceeding adapted to his
peculiar situation has ever been incorporated into the Act. In many cases a
wage garnishment compels a debtor, willing and able to pay his debts out
of his future earnings. to seek a discharge in bankruptcy in order to live
decently and to retain his job.7 2 or if he wishes to avoid the stigma of bank-
ruptcv, to borrow money at high interest rates without reducing his total
indebtedness."3 Nor do the bulk of creditors approve of forcing a debtor to
pursue either of these courses.7 4 Since debtors are rarely willing to pay their
69. In the absence of specific statutory declaration, such a provision would probably
be held to supersede state assignment statutes. It may be advisable, however, to retain
state statutes with minimum requirements to provide further control over fraudulent
assignments.
70. But cf. Sanderson, A Criticism of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act (1932) 37
Co.imt. L. J. 374, 378.
71. §4; § 1(27). Suggestions have been advanced that debts for necessities of
life be exempted from a discharge and that a minimum amount of debts be set up as
a prerequisite for a voluntary petition. Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 2, 4; (1931)
5 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 179. 182 (similar Canadian provisions). These provisions
would of course operate mainly to deprive wage earners of the benefits of voluntary
bankruptcy. For a suggestion that wage earners and farmers be deprived of their
exemption from involuntary bankruptcy, see (1915) 80 CENT. L. J. 32. That all bank-
ruptcy proceedings should be limited to traders, see King, Bankruptcy Law and Prac-
tice (1927) 7 Micn. S. B. J. *47, *56. Wage earners are also given a priority of
$600 each for claims earned within three months of bankruptcy. §64b(5).
72. Wage earner cases comprise one-half of the bankruptcy total. STRENGTIHENING
OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8, 85. That garnishment is often the precipitating
cause of many bankruptcies, see DEPARTMENT OF COMIERCE, CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCY
AMONG CONSUMERS (Domestic Commerce Series, No. 82) (1933) ; Douglas, Wage
Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 591, 614 et seq.
For a method of reducing garnishments, see Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act
(1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1059 (priority in collection proceedings according to (late of
credit extension). On the general problem of collection remedies, see Radin, Debt
(1931) 5 Excyc. Soc. ScIENcEs 32; Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administration and
Wage Earner Bankruptcies (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487. On wage assignments, see Fortas,
Wage Assignments in Chicago-Statc Street Furniture Co. vs. Armour & Co. (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 526.
73. See STRENGTITENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 83.
74. Many creditors are forced to garnishee a debtor for self-protection against




debts after they have been forced into bankruptcy, creditors have heartily en-
dorsed the proposal for "debtor relief" of the Hastings-Michener Bill, which
provided that a debtor who agreed to pay his debts out of future earnings
over a period of time would be freed from the onus of bankruptcy and pro-
tected from garnishment proceedings.7 5  While that provision was never
enacted, several bankruptcy courts have stretched Section 74 in order to set
up special machinery for wage earner amortization, 0 and several states have
enacted statutes modeled after the bill."7 In order to increase the use, scope
and flexibility of such proceedings, the National Bankruptcy Conference in-
corporated a special section for wage earner amortization into its omnibus
measure.
Under the Chandler Bill, a debtor earning less than $3,600 a year may
file an original petition or a petition in a bankruptcy proceeding, before or
after adjudication, stating that he is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as
they mature, and that he desires to effect a settlement out of his future earn-
ings.78 This petition is to act as a stay of adjudication, although, if necessary,
the court may require indemnity when bankruptcy proceedings are pending.79
The debtor is to file a statement of affairs as a basis for the consideration of
the plan submitted by him at the first meeting of creditors.8 0 The plan is to
include provisions for a settlement on any terms with unsecured creditors
and may include provisions dealing with secured creditors severally.8 ' In
order to protect against garnishment, the debtor's future earnings are to be
placed under the supervision of the court .8 While the court is empowered to
issue all orders necessary to effectuate the plan-including orders, with the
effect of a judgment, to any employer of the debtorm3 it may, on the other
hand, extend the time to cure a default s ' and also modify the time or amount
of payments when the circumstances of the debtor warrant or require8 s In
addition, the plan may provide for the rejection of executory contracts and
for any other matters not foreclosed by specific provisions of the Subsection.80
When a majority of unsecured creditors and all affected secured creditors,
75. The bill is described in STRENGrENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. sumpra note 2,
at 77.
76. The federal court in Birmingham used the section most frequently. For a list
of other federal courts which have used § 74 for this purpose, see Comment (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 1285, 1289; see also (1936) 11 J. N. A. REF. BAnn-. 32.
77. See Minahan, Wage Earner Ganishment: A Plan for Personal Receivrship
(1935) 10 Wis. L. REv. 2272; Legis. (1934) 9 Wis. L REv. 177. See note 94, infra.
78. § 12-IVb(1); § 12-IVa(2) (a).
79. §12-IVb(3).
80. § 12-IVb(2).
81. § 12-IVc(l). The plan may also provide for priority of payment during the
period of extension as between the secured and unsecured debts affected by the plan.
Ibid. But claims secured by estates in real property or chattels real may not be in-
cluded within a plan of amortization. § 12-IVa(2) (b).
82. § 12-IVc(2); § 12-IVe(3) (b); § 12-IVf(1) (a).
83. § 12-IVe(3) (c). 85. § 12-IVc(2).
84. § 12-IVe(5) (b). 86. §12-IVc(3), (4).
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before or after the institution of court proceedings, have approved, the court
is to confirm the plan if it is equitable, feasible. and for the best interests of
creditors, s ; and to appoint a trustee to receive and distribute the earnings of
the debtor.85 A debtor who files an original petition may not be adjudicated
without his consent.-9 Discharges are to be granted without adjudication upon
completion of all payments, but where a debtor's default is excusable, he may
be granted a discharge three years after the inception of the plan. 0 The sin-
gle deposit for costs. expenses, or priorities is a maximum of $15 to indem-
nify the referee.9 1 Commissions to the referee and trustee are payable only
upon actual distribution of periodic dividends. -
Objections to the wage earner provisions of the Chandler Bill may be made
on three scores: that it is impracticable for a ,ubstantial number of wage
earners to amortize their debts under any scheme or. more particularly, under
the Chandler Bill : that even if practicable. it is undesirable for wage earners
to do so: and finally that. if practicable and desirable, amortization should not
be conducted in the federal courts.
]n view of the marked success with which amortization has been conducted
by private companies. "3 state and foreign courts, and federal bankruptcy
courts."4 large :.cale amortization appears practicable. especially if the debtors
are induced to amortize before resorting to loan companies." The experiences
of the Municipal Court in Cleveland under the trusteeship statute and of the
federal bankruptcy court in Birmingham under Section 74 since the institu-
tion oif amortization proceedings in both courts in tile middle of 1933 indicate
that many debtors are both willing and able to amortize their debts. From that
time until the end of 1936. 1.577 applications for trusteeships had been filed
$7. §12-IVetI1. (2). (3). 90. §12-IVe(7).
88. § 12-IVd (2) (d). 91. § 12-IVd(2) (b).
89. § 12-IWe(5). 92. §12-IVe(4).
93. See Douglas and .Marshall. supra note 51. at 53: Minahan, supra note 77, at
246: Nugent. Devices For Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit (1935) 2 LAw &
CoxT.MiP. PROD. 258. 262: (1931) 5 J. N. A. REF. BAXKR. 181: Joint Hearings, supra
note 11. at 581.
94. State statutes have been adopted in Ohio (for a number of municipal courts).
Michigan. Minnesota, and Wisconsin. For a discussion of the statutes, see Douglas,
supra note 72. at 636: Minahan. loc. cit. supra note 77: Nehemkis, Tie Boston Poor
Debtor Court-A Stwdy in Collection Procedure (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 561, 563, n. 9;
Nugent. loc. cit. su pra note 93. A similar Nebraska statute [NED. Comp. STAT. (1922)
§248-259] has been repealed. The small claims statutes also generally provide for
amortization of a single claim. See Nehemkis. loc. cit. supra; Nugent, loc. cit. supra;
N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1937, p. 25, col. 1. As to federal courts see note 76 supra. For
a discussion of the English amortization system, see Holm-Nielsen, The Problem of
Wage Earner Bankruptcies and Its English Solution (1935) 9 J. N. A. REF. BANcK,.
103: (1904) 117 L. T. 560; (1908) 125 L. T. 122, 188.
95. Compare STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 80, with
Douglas, supra note 72, at 626, and Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 623. For a dis-
cussion of the enormous borrowing by wage earners, in many cases to consolidate exist-
ing indebtedness, see Minahan, supra note 77, at 224; Joint Hearings, supra at 11.
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in the Cleveland court. A total of $163,828.67, almost all oi w hich has been
disbursed through 41,023 checks, was received from debtors owing an aver-
age of $550. The cost of operation of the department amounted to $11,000.
none of which has been assessed against the estates. Of the 923 trusteeshipq
thus far dissolved, 40% were carried through completely; 231- were dropped
voluntarily by the debtor with two-thirds or three-fourths of his debts paid
up; 20% were dropped voluntarily by the debtor within 60 days of the
filing; 10% were abated by the debtor filing a bankruptcy petition: and in
7%o no payment was ever made. It thu can be seen that over 60% of the
debtors using the trusteeship statute paid off the bulk of their indehtedlne4.
In Birmingham 340 of the 1,800 wage earner-; who have used the pccial
machinery set up under Section 74 have paid their debts in full. Most of the
cases are still pending, only 187 having thuv iar been distin-ed. Of the
$268,854.94 collected by the court. 14,.845.03 was disbursed during 193b.t-
Both courts report that these proceedings carry less of a -.tigma than do hank-
ruptcy proceedings; that numerous bankruptcies have )wen lprevented In
amortization: that all classes (of creditors cooperate. -ince the. are returnvI
a substantial amount with little or no expense: and that the wage earner ha-
been freed from the annoyance of creditor', high court co.ts. and po;sihle
loss of employment.0 5 Sonic have maintained. .in the tther hand. that mo,,t
applicants are sensitive to the implication that it is necessary for a public
official to handle their family finances and that wage earners are forced t,-
invoke the amortization procedure through pressure bv ent lr,3ers or cred-
itors.9
While the practicability of amortization is shuwn by it% successful u.e in
different localities,O it does not necessarily follow that the method of amor:i-
zation provided by the Chandler Bill will operate as successfully a- those con-
sidered. The bill, it is true, proceeds with an initial advantage over ither
systems by permitting debts to be scaled down as well as etended vithot
interest payments, and by offering relici to the large class earning les than
96. These figures are based on information iurnished the YA,o LAw Jtll't.'Z.%t
by Chief Justice Burt XV. Griffin and judge David 'Moylan oi the Municipal Court 64i
Cleveland.
97.. Communication to the YALE LAW Jot'\.cAt. from Referee \'alntine J. Xesbint.
special referee for amortization proceedings in Birmingham. Alabama. Feb. 28, 1937.
98. Communications to the YALE L%w JOU NAL from Chief Justice Griffin and
Referee Nesbit, Feb. 4, 1937. See notes 96. 97. supra. Amortization also effects a large
saving in interest charges, by making it nnece-mary for \-age earners to resort to loan
companies. STRENGTIHNING OF PRocEDue, op. cit. supra note 2. at 3.
99. Nugent, supra note 93, at 266.
100. For suggestions that local conditions may make for successful use of amortization.
see Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J., 1285, 1289. Amortization is likely to operate suc-
cessfully only where the required payments are less than can be obtained by garnish-
ment. Nugent, supra note 93, at 267. But cf. Sturges and Cooper. loc. cit. spra r,,te 72.
It may be noted that wage assignments are virtually prohibited in Ohio. Fortas. W ane
Assignments in Chicago (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 526. 552. n. 87.
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$3,600 per year.1"1 On the other hand, the power given the court to order
an employer to pay the debtor's wages into court will probably elicit little
debtor support, 10 2 not only because an amortization notice is likely to prove
as annoying to an employer as a notice of garnishment103 but also because
a wage earner apparently has no power to terminate a plan when he desires.
While the bill is not clear, the granting of this power to the court seems to
indicate that, at least so long as a debtor reinains employed, default will not
be permitted and delinquencies will be checked by ordering the employer
to pay the sums due into court.'0 4 If debtors are to be induced to invoke
the Bill, a wage earner should have the power to terminate the proceedings
at any time, with or without filing a bankruptcy petition,105 even though the
incorporation of such a provision into the bill operates to reduce its efficiency
as a collection iedium. 1°0' Wage earners are more likely to be attracted to
proceedings under the Chandler Bill, moreover, if the court's power to adjust
the time and amount of payments is limited to reductions and extensions.
While a wage earner who files an original petition is protected against ad-
judication without his consent,10 7 his right to a discharge in subsequent bank-
ruptcy proceedings might well have been safeguarded by providing that
neither the failure to complete payment under a plan nor any other delin-
101. Those wage earners who would not be entitled to a bankruptcy discharge may not
secure relief. § 12-IVe(2). A similar provision is contained in the Arrangement Sub-
section. § 12-le(4). Since consummation of plans under both of these sections benefits
creditors, these penalties seem a futile gesture. Cf. Joint Hearings, .supra note 11, at 745.
102. If curtailment of collection remedies does have an effect on extension of credit
[see infra p. 1207], a debtor may have difficulty in obtaining new credit since he must
submit his future earnings to the supervision of the court and since confirmation of a
plan does not operate as a discharge. If this possibility is to be precluded, priority
should be allowed to new obligations assumed with court approval. Such a provision is
made in the Arrangement Subsection. § 12-Ic(6). But see Minahan, supra note 77,
at 237.
103. Several large Ohio employers have refused to honor assignments issued by
employees under the Ohio amortization statute. Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Chief Judge Burt W. Griffin of the Cleveland Municipal Court, Jan.
28, 1937.
104. Another provision of the act seems clearly to contemplate voluntary default and
termination of the proceedings. Section 12-IVe(S) provides that in case of default
in an original proceeding the court shall enter an order dismissing the proceeding. The
further provision [§ 12-IVe (5) (b)] that the court may extend the time to cure a
default may be brought in harmony with the interpretation suggested in the text by
assuming that the default contemplated referred to one caused by loss of employment.
105. Cf. McKeever v. Local Finance Co., 80 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
106. The best results were secured under amortization in Ohio where definite
assignments of wages were secured from the employee. Communication to the YALE
LAW JOURNAL from Chief Judge Griffin of the Cleveland Municipal Court, Jan. 28,
1937. For a discussion of various methods of dealing with wages under amortization
plans, see Minahan, supra note 77, at 230.
107. For a suggestion that wage earners who default unjustifiedly should be ad-
judicated, see Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51, at 55.
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quency should prejudice that right.10 8 Indeed it would have been helpful
to allow a debtor whose default is excused to obtain an immediate discharge
without going into bankruptcy, instead of forcing him to wait until three
years after the confirmation of the plan to obtain a discharge without ad-
judication. 10 9 Although the consent of unsecured creditors can probably be
readily obtained, there may be occasional difficulty in gaining the approval of
secured creditors. It may be wise, therefore, to delete the requirement of
creditor consent, or at least to allow a majority of all creditors to bind secured
creditors. 110 While the bill attempts to keep costs and deposits down to a
minimum, it is questionable whether fees are small enough, although a deter-
mination of this problem depends upon experience in the administration of
the Act."' It would be sound policy to require that one referee handle all
such cases, and that one trustee-whether referee, clerk of court, special
official, or private individual or corporation-be appointed to act in all cases,
since the limited functions of the trustee and the small size of the cases will
make specialization a prerequisite to efficient administration."12 Despite these
defects the Chandler Bill is probably as well conceived to handle amortization
cases as any of the schemes now in use.
Although it may be practicable for wage earners to amortize their debts
under the Chandler Bill, it may be questioned whether the efficiency of the
provision as a collection proceeding is not counteracted by social disadvan-
tages.1" It is likely that the bulk of wage earners can pay their debts within
a reasonable period of time only by severely reducing their standard of liv-
ing" 4 or, if they are not assisted in budgeting, by acquiring a new set of
unpaid obligations. This sacrifice can be minimized in severity and duration
108. Cf. Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 22, 26.
109. Id. at 26.
110. Cf. Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51, at 56. All classes of creditors have
cooperated in amortizations under § 74. Communication to the YALE hLAw Jo n .AL
from Referee Valentine j. Nesbit, Feb. 28, 1937. The section further errs in excluding
realty from its scope. § 12-IVa(2) (b).
111. In the administration of amortization provisions an attempt should be made to
keep procedure simplified so that the services of lawyers can be dispensed with. Debtors
should be encouraged to deal directly with referees. Cf. Joint learings, supra note 11,
at 21.
112. See pp. 1198, 1203.
113. The danger that with the establishment of amortization debtors who used bank-
ruptcy will be subjected to a greater stigma than formerly and that their applications
for discharge may be granted less readily does not seem too serious, and in any case
can be guarded against to some extent by a specific statutory declaration that those
wage earners who invoke bankruptcy should not be prejudiced in their applications for
discharge.
114. Douglas, supra note 72, at 631; Comment (1934) 43 Y.nX L J. 1235, 1292.
Objections to the amortization provision of the Hastings-Michener Bill were grounded
partially on the coupling of that provision with one for suspended discharge. See
Sturges and Cooper, mtpra note 72, at 493.
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under the Chandler Bill by scaling down debts substantially.' 1  But since
wage earners may often be induced to undertake unbearable burdens by cred-
itor or employer pressure, or by overoptimism, it may be preferable to appoint
a special official in large urban areas, at least, to handle such cases, so that
approval would not be given perfunctorily, but only after consideration of
the desirability of outright discharge in the light of experience of similarly
situated wage earners. The Bill might also set a two-year limit for such
amortization agreements," 6 and supplement the referee's power to modify
the time and amount of payment with power to dismiss the proceeding! and
grant a discharge when he thought that continued payments were no longer
possible or would impose too great a hardship. Under no condition should
a wage earner be compelled to continue payments after an agreement has
become distasteful. These methods of protecting debtors from severe reduc-
tion of their living standards under amortization plans seem preferable to
the suggestion that the debtor make very small payments over a long period,
even when that proposal is made practicable by providing for immediate pay-
ment to creditors of discounted dividends by a central government amortiza-
tion fund ;117 for if the desirability of subjecting debtors to protracted, though
small, payments be conceded, government subsidization of creditors by pur-
chase of bad debt claims can hardly be approved.
Some of those who concede the practicability and desirability of amortiza-
tion question the wisdom of a federal rather than a state amortization sys-
tem,"18 or indeed of any provision for court amortization." 0  The claim that
the states should control an amortization .ystem because amortization is
intimately bound up with collection remedies which states alone regulate is
not persuasive, since amortization has no necessary connection with collection
remedies. There is little force in the objections to having federal officials
collect small claims or to increasing the business of already crowded federal
courts, 20 because state governments can neither scale down obligations initi-
ally nor grant discharges to debtors who do not complete layments without
unanimous creditor consent.' 2'
115. A criticism levelled at the operation of the Michigan statute was the inability
to provide for reduction of indebtedness. Nugent. supra note 93. at 268. Cf. Douglas
and Marshall, supra note 51, at 57.
116. The Bill fails to provide an express time limit for plans. The only related
provision vests the court with power to grant a discharge if the debtor has not com-
pleted payment at the expiration of three years through no fault of his own. § 12-IVe(7).
117. See Holm-Nielsen, loc. cit. snpra note 94. A lengthy period of amortization
would generally be valueless to creditors.
118. Douglas, supra note 72, at 637.
119. Nugent, supra note 93, at 266.
120. See Sturges and Cooper, .rupra note 72, at 494. The objection that a federal
provision for amortization would be unconstitutional as not within the bankruptcy power
does not seem well-founded. In re Landquist. 70 F. (2d) 929, (C. C.A. 7th, 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 584 (1935).
121. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140; Legis. (1934) 9 Wis. L. REV. 177. Since it is
not certain that the courts would hold that state amortization statutes were superseded
[V'ol. 46: 11771196
TIE CHANDLER BILL
There are those who insist, on the other hand, that real relief can lie secured
only through out-of-court proceedings since a wage earner, willing to amor-
tize through a small loan company, may hesitate to chance the .tigma of court
proceedings3. A court provision is essential, though, because no existing
private organizations provide a service of this sort on a large scale. There
remains the question of what protection, if any, should he accorded out-oi-
court amortizations. The Chandler Bill attempts to discourage minority ob-
struction of such amortizations by allowing the use of consenta obtained
before the institution of proceedings. These amurtizations might be encour-
aged more effectively by adopting a provi-ion similar to that suggested in
connection with common law compositions.' -m But it is probably not wise to
strengthen extrajudicial arrangements, even if the provisions (f the Chandler
Bill do not operate successfully, since there is a grave danger that wage
earners may be imposed upon by private org-anizations, 12 4 and that they may
undertake obligations payable only with the greatest of difficulty.
While amortization in the federal courts is probably lracticalble from the
viewpoint of collection, reduced living standards may accompany amortization
even if the suggested safeguards are adopted. If these protective devices are
provided, however, the benefits to debtor morale through amortization,tm
if they are real and not illusorv, r -6 should make desirable the enactment of
this fundamentally "creditor" measure.'
2 7
INCREASING DIVIDENDS ON LIQUIDATION
The small dividends distributed to creditors through bankruptcy may be
attributed largely to dissipation of assets before the filing of a petition, but a
considerable loss results from improper administration after an estate is
brought into bankruptcy.'28 One of the most obvious methods of increasing
by a federal amortization provision [see Minahan, Mipra note 77, at 228, I. 19], a
specific legislative statement of intention might help to indicate that state statutes are
to be superseded in order to guard against the operation of competitive systems.
122. Nugent, m.pra note 93, at 266.
123. See p. 1184 supra.
124. That control of amortization by employers is also unsound, see Cover, op. cit.
supra note 42, at 66.
125. Communications to the YAi.E LAW JO'RVAL from Referee Nesbit and Judge
Moylan.
126. Referee Paul H. King, chairman of the National Bankruptcy Cunference has
stated that it is "fanciful" to attempt to remove the "stigma" of bankruptcy by "debtor"
proceedings. (1933) 7 J. N. A. REF. BAEL.R. 9S, 100. See also note 33, snpra.
127. Retail credit orgauizations have wholeheartedly supported amortization pro-
visions. Douglas, supra note 72, at 631, n. 116; Mullinix, Credit and Bankruptcy Reform
(1935) 40 Comm. L. J. 196. And see Joint Hcarings, mipra note 11, at 631: "Of course,
anyone who grants credit would naturally be in favor of it, because it provides a way
by which some of those old debts may be paid."
128. Hanna, The Rcceiver in Bankruptcy: An Introduction to Bankruptcy Reform
(1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. Rsv. 241, 25S; see note I supra. The low dividends are partially
attributable to the large proportion of small asset cases, where expenses eat up the bulk
19371 1197
1198 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46: 1177
realization on assets and of reducing administrative expenses is to improve
the personnel of bankruptcy administration. The Bankruptcy Act leaves to
creditor initiative the selection of a trustee, examination of the debtor and
opposition to discharge. But the prevalence of absentee creditors and the
probability of small dividends combine to make creditor interest in bank-
ruptcy proceedings virtually non-existent so that trustees are chosen by proxy-
solicitors, interested only in prospective fees and expenses, and discharges
are almost uniformly granted without investigation or contest .1 2  Moreover,
incompetent receivers are frequently appointed by courts to take over an
estate before the trustee is elected.1 30
To establish an efficient administrative system, receiverships and trustee-
ships must be entrusted in each district to one or a limited number of ade-
quately compensated public officials, or private individuals or organizations,
rather than to a large inexperienced group. Under the regime of a skilled,
permanent, and specialized liquidator, all necessary steps would be taken at
the proper time; an accounts receivable collection department would be set
up; connections would be established with prospective buyers to allow ad-
vantageous disposition of goods at private sales; and the discovery of prefer-
ences would be aided by an examination and an audit in every case. 131
Two basic systems have been proposed to effect this result. One calls for
the appointment of salaried government liquidators or private individuals
or organizations in cities of over 250,000 population to administer either all
cases or those in which assets are less than $5,000. A second plan would limit
trusteeships to licensed trustees appointed by the court but replaceable, by
creditors, or elected by creditors originally. 13 2 Despite the opportunity for
of assets. Wage earner cases comprise more than half the total. Only 21% of the
cases involve merchants and manufacturers. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE. op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 7.
129. For descriptions of these and other evils detailed later, see STRENGTHENING OF
PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31; DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2. at 78. For a
list of other reports, see Clark, Reform in Bankruptcy Administration (1930) 43 HARV.
L. REv. 1189, n. 1. Nor are these defects localized. COMER AND JAMEs, A CRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF OHIO (1927). The deficiencies of the Bank-
ruptcy Act have been well epitomized by former Solicitor-General Thacher: "If there
is any agency less competent than a court to carry on the business of liquidating an
estate, it is a general town meeting. The bankruptcy act requires the cooperation of
both." See DONOVAN, supra, at 234.
130. See articles cited supra note 129.
131. Clark, supra note 129, at 1314. These are the advantages which accrue to
adjustment bureaus because of their specialized organizations. But see Sturges and
Cooper, supra note 72, at 492. The Irving Trust Company, as official receiver in New
York City, prepared a list of 47 steps that were necessary in the administration of any
bankruptcy. See Hanna, supra note 128, at 262. Obviously a liquidator, acting only
occasionally, could not properly hope to attend to all details.
132. See Coles, The Donovan Report on the Bankruptcy Law and Administration
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 431, 432; DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 29; STRENGTHENING
OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 104. Both of these plans would except cases
where special circumstances required the services of an unofficial or unlicensed liquidator.
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political abuse, either of these plans is to be preferred to the present chaotic
system of selection. The success of state departments of banking and of the
federal comptroller of the currency in liquidating banks, and of the Irving
Trust Company as standing receiver in the Southern District of New York
indicates that official liquidators, whether public or private, can operate ef-
ficiently.las And experience in Canada and England demonstrates that it
is possible to license trustees with a minimum of political control.1a3
A system of official liquidators is to be preferred, however, to a licensing
system. 1 35 Licenses would necessarily be issued to some inefficient and dis-
honest trustees, since there are few developed organizations; licensed liquid-
ators could not easily be induced to accept the small unprofitable cases which
comprise 90% of the business of liquidation; and the granting of numerous
licenses would impede the development of large-scale liquidating organiza-
tions, especially in smaller cities. 30 Moreover, a dual set of officials can be
eliminated under a licensing system only by dispensing with the prompt ap-
pointment of a receiver. If it is desired to retain the benefits of official
liquidation, but to allow creditor election of trustees, official receivers might
be appointed. Trusteeships could be confined almost exclusively to these
officials if they were permitted to notify creditors of their availability to act
as trustee and to send proxies with proofs of claims.
1 3 7
The Chandler Bill makes no serious effort to provide for adequate per-
sonnel. While the bill deletes the prohibition-aimed at the Irving Trust
Company-of the appointment of a standing receiver in any district, 33 and
gives the court power to remove a trustee on its own motion and to appoint
a trustee when one fails to qualify, 3 it makes no affirmative provision for
133. DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12; Hanna, sutpra note 128, at 250, 256; Hanna,
Govenzinent Supervision of Bankruptcy Administration (1932) 7 J. N. A. REP. BAi.,m.
30, 32; (1932) 9 Am. BANKR. REv. 117. But cf. 9 id. 157.
134. DoxovAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 91; Hanna, supra note 128, at 254.
135. Coles, supra note 132, at 435. But cf. Communication to the YALE LAw JoL'.li.
from William J. Reilley, Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Canada: "As stated before it
is not possible to compare the relative merits of the Canadian system with a system of
official trustees, but I am of the opinion that the present system is much better than
even that of official trustees for the reason that it does maintain a direct control over
trustees as compared with the arbitrary acts of officials with administrative responsi-
bility that are so much a feature of bureaucratic administration."
136. Joint Hcarings. supra note 11, at 366; (1935) 9 J. N. A. RE,. Bam. 140;
(1936) 11 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 24.
137. A similar procedure was followed in the Southern District of New York with
the Irving Trust Company. Report of the Irving Trust Co. as Receiver from Jan. 16,
1929 to Sept. 30, 1932.' The Trust Company was elected trustee in S0-901% of all cases.
Report of the Irving Trust Co. as Receiver from JaIL 16, 1929 to June 30, 1933, p. 20.
138. This statute was passed as a result of strong pressure by lawyers. It was
generally conceded that the Irving Trust Company had handled estates very efficiently.
See note 133, supra.
139. § 2a(17). An earlier draft of the bill made provision for "registered" trustees,
but apparently placed almost no restrictions on registration. H. R. 10382, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) §45; (1936) 11 J. N. A. REF. BANm. 23.
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the initial selection of competent receivers and trustees. Instead it seeks to
improve the existing system without altering its basic framework. An at-
tempt is made to attract more capable officials by providing adequate com-
pensation for trustees in small cases and for receivers and trustees in ar-
rangements.140 In the rare case when creditors are interested in an estate,
the Chandler Bill facilitates their participation in administration by giving
creditors' committees official standing to act in an advisory capacity and
present to the court any question affecting the administration of the estate.'
41
To provide for the more usual situation where creditors are unconcerned,
the Bill makes a feeble effort to curb the evil of solicitation. Fee splitting is
made sufficient ground for removal or dismissal, and for withholding of com-
pensation.4 Claims of $50 or less are to be counted in amount but not in
number.'
43
The administrative personnel could be improved further by insuring the
retention of more competent referees. If all referees were placed as far as
is possible upon a full time basis, a more efficient referee's organization could
be set up and more capable men attracted to the position by hope of a re-
spectable income.' 44 While the policy statement in the Chandler Bill that
referees shall be employed if possible on a full-time basis1 45 seems little more
than a pious hope, it is perhaps politically impracticable to cut down their
number immediately. The Bill soundly provides for more permanent tenure
by lengthening the term of referees from two to six years. 140 Unfortunately,
140. § 48c(1) ; § 48f. Inadequate compensation has resulted in the delegation of
administrative duties by receivers and trustees to lawyers. This practice has lowered
the quality of administration and has resulted in large legal fees. DoNoVAN. op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 2, 66; STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 37. The
prevalence of high legal fees is also attributable to the formalities of bankruptcy pro-
cedure. DONOVAN, supra, at 17, 227; see p. 1201 in ra.
141. § 44b; § 58a. Cf. DONOVAN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 5, 31, 154-55; Billig, supra
note 51, 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 319.
142. § 48e.
143. § 56c. For a discussion of the much more elaborate proxy safeguards employed
in England, see DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 29-30. At the present time the
Standing Bankruptcy Rules Committee in the Southern District of New York is in-
vestigating to see if the rules relating to solicitation of proxies can be strengthened.
Disciplinary proceedings are also contemplated. Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Judge John C. Knox, Jan. 15, 1937.
The bill provides that the attorney for the petitioning creditors shall not be dis-
qualified from acting as attorney for the receiver or trustee [§ 44c], a practice prohibited
in some districts in order to curb solicitation by attorneys. The draftsmen of the bill
felt that it was unwise to forbid the retention of the one most familiar with the estate.
Their decision is probably justified, since any rule of this sort can be circumvented by
the collusion of two attorneys. For a discussion of this problem, see DONOVAN, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 99-102; Clark, supra note 129, at 1211-12 (the problem should be left
to local rules).
144. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 27, 123.
145. § 37a.
140,. g 4a. All newly appointed referees are required to be lawyers. §35a(5).
Where a referee's office is exclusively used for his official duties, the bill permits him
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the present fee system of compensation is retained, although, to take care of
isolated abuses it is provided that a judge may fix a maximum remuneration
for a referee in general, and in a particular case.147 The salary system would
seem superior to the fee system because the possibility of abuse through ref-
erees rendering reviewable decisions affecting their compensation appears
greater than the benefits which may accrue to estates through the inducement
that a fee system offers to secure the greatest net return and to wind up cases
quickly.
148
If the present method of selecting administrators is retained, supervision
of their actions should be withdrawn from the courts and entrusted elsewhere.
Although it is fruitless and wasteful to place the administration of an estate
under minute surveillance, the general conduct of receivers and trustees
should be subjected to scrutiny by a central bankruptcy supervisor and
regional assistants. These administrators would supervise receivers, trustees,
and referees, investigate abuses and hear creditors' complaints, recommend
uniform practices and standard schedules of fees for certain services, and
prepare statistics.140  But the Chandler Bill in this respect merely requires
that the attorney general gather more adequate statistics than he does at
present.160
Even if efficient administrators are appointed, experience has demonstrated
that the procedural restrictions of the Act make business-like administration
a difficult matter. The Bankruptcy Act, designed in a time of slow com-
munication for the administration of large estates, provides an elaborate and
legalistic system of court and creditor supervision over the actions of re-
ceivers and trustees. Though judges and creditors usually approve perfunc-
torily or ignore entirely those administrative actions which are submitted to
them for ratification, regulatory rules of court, designed to provide for closer
supervision over incompetent and dishonest receivers and trustees, have been
added to these statutory technicalities.laI The restrictions, unnecessary when
competent officers are appointed, do not prevent abuses by dishonest and in-
to charge the cost of equipment as an expense. § 62a. This provision will allow the
adequate equipment of an office for the business of a court.
147. § 40a.
148. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDuRE, op. cit. smpra note 2, at 30.
149. DoxovAx, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 26. The Inspector-General in Banluptcy in
England, and the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in Canada perform these functions.
Id. at 179; (1936) 11 J. N. A. RsF. BANmr. 24. Such supervisors would also be
needed to control licenses under a system of licensed or official administrators.
150. § 53a. As to the inadequacy of the statistical reports, see Douglas and Mar-
shall, supra note 51, at 25, n. 2; Joint Hcarings, mspra note 11, at 619. Since these
complaints were voiced, even less information has been published in the reports of the
attorney-general. Compare REPs. ATT'Y GEN. with BANxR. R S. BoAnn OF TnADaE
(England) and Raps. SUPER. iN BANER. (Canada).
151. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 37; Du:.ovA, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 4. See c. g., General Order 44, requiring a receiver or trustee to obtain
permission irom the judge to appoint an attorney.
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efficient officials, but only succeed in making the retention of attorneys neces-
sary and in slowing up administration considerably. And dilatory adminis-
tration makes for large maintenance expenses in commercial cases.
5 2
The Chandler Bill seeks to expedite administration in part by clothing
administrators with greater powers. Referees are given jurisdiction to grant
discharges and to confirm arrangements or wage earner plans, subject, of
course, to review. 153 Proceedings may be referred to the referee before as
well as after adjudication. 5 4 The referee is given the power-one formerly
reserved to the judge-to declare dividends at more frequent intervals than
those set in the Act.'55 But even though the extended jurisdiction of referees
will reduce the work of judges, it might be advisable to provide, at least in
the large metropolitan areas, that one judge, or more if necessary, be assigned
to handle all appeals in bankruptcy. 150 A number of trials could be eliminated
by the submission of all disputes to the judge in chambers.' 1" And the time
of trustees and receivers might be expended on more useful pursuits by dis-
pensing with the necessity of court approval of recurring administrative
acts.115s
The Bill also seeks to speed administration by reducing superfluous proced-
ural details. Schedules, or at least a list of creditors, must now be filed with
a voluntary petition; in involuntary proceedings the time for filing is cut from
ten to five days. 159 Some notices to creditors are eliminated. 10 The provision
whereby any notice may be waived can be used to accelerate administration,
since several of the required notices need only be given to the creditors' com-
mittee where one has been appointed.' 0 ' The provisions regarding ancillary
administration are simplified.' 0 2 Early discharge of the trustee is facilitat-
152. Liquidation is much speedier in Canada than in the United States. DONOVAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 162.
153. § 38a(4), (5). See Joint Hearings, supra note 11. at 533, 606.
154. § 22a.
155. § 65b. Cf. Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 724.
156. This procedure is followed in Canada and England. DONOVAN, oP. Cit. snpra
note 2, at 174. Such a measure would probably not be necessary in the Southern District
of New York, since the volume of business is so large that each judge is a specialist
in bankruptcy affairs. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Judge John C.
Knox of the Southern District of New York, Jan. 15, 1937. A more fundamental
suggestion for improvement is that referees be given the powers of bankruptcy courts
and that appeals be taken directly to the circuit court of appeals. See McLaughlin, supra
note 6, at 374.
157. This practice is followed in Canada. DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 168.
158. E.g., the requirement of court approval of compromise agreements made by
the receiver or trustee [§27a] might be eliminated. Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at
694.
159. § 7a(8).
160. § 58. Compare the recommendations made in DONOVAN, op. cit. sn pra note 2,
at 32.
161. § 58. See DONOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6-7.
162. § 2a(20); §6ore r60 rF,, 14 Hearings, supra note 11, at 533.
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ed.' And while other minor procedural changes might have been made to
expedite administration, at least the time for filing claims should have been
reduced from six to three months or a shorter period.'4
These suggestions for improving personnel and expediting administration
should certainly be adopted in small cases. Even before Section 77B drew
the bulk of large cases away from general bankruptcy administration,c'
assets were less than $5,000 in 95% of the cases." 1 The elaborate machinery,
designed for large bankruptcies, is certainly useless in small cases, particu-
larly wage earner cases, where bankruptcy must fail because the debtor's
assets are usually tied up by conditional sales contracts or by exemptions. 6 7
The Chandler Bill makes a gesture toward summary administration by pro-
viding that a no-asset case may be closed without a final meeting of credit-
ors.' A more fundamental measure would reduce administrative details to
a minimum by following the English practice of requiring the appointment
of an official liquidator in all cases under a certain size.IcO One notice to all
creditors of the pendency of a proceeding would suffice except where other
notices of important steps are requested, and the employment of lawyers
would thus be unnecessary. The only purpose of small debtor proceedings
is the granting of a discharge, and while discharge applications can be thor-
oughly investigated, if necessary,' -0 these cases can be wound up in a short
time. Legislation providing for summary administration of small cases
brought into bankruptcy could be supplemented with provisions exempting
from bankruptcy all wage earners who earn up to $5,000 and all persons whose
debts are less than $2,000, since dividends are rarely realized from such es-
tates."7 ' The right of these persons to invoke voluntary proceedings would
of course be preserved.
While realization on assets can be increased substantially only by appoint-
ment of more efficient administrators,'7- several sections of the Chandler Bill
163. § 66a.
164. Cf. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 131. For other
suggestions to expedite administration, see id. at 125; DoNovAN, op. cit. stpra note 2,
at 24, 110-125; Clark, supra note 129, at 1198, 1212-13; Joint Hearings, Mspra note 11,
at 693; (1932) 7 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 19. The bill also cuts down epenses in a
few minor details. See, e.g., § 70f (number of appraisers reduced).
165. Communication from Judge John C. Knox to the YA.E LAw, Jou=NAL, Jan. 15,
1937.
166. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.
167. Douglas, supra note 72, at 626. See also (1936) 11 J. N. A. REF. BA,n. 32,
36, 43.
168. § 55e. The draftsmen refused to adopt a proposal that discharges be disposed
of at the first meeting of creditors where no basis of objection appeared and no objection
was contemplated. It was thought that information which would bar a discharge is
often discovered at a later date.
169. DoNovAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 176; Douglas and Marshall, supra note 51,
at 56. In England, 80% of all cases are so administered. DouoVAn, loc. cit. supra.
170. See infra p. 1206 as to the desirability of such investigation.
171. Joit Hearings, supra note 11, at 741.
172. Cf. DoNOVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 193.
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aim to reach the same result on a smaller scale. Provision is made for the
liquidation of dower to allow advantageous sales, 173 for increasing the effi-
ciency of turnover proceedings, 174 and for the filing of a notice of bankruptcy
in the county where a bankrupt's real estate is situated, 175 thus guarding
against disposal of realty to a bona fide purchaser.
Although it may be doubted whether the amount expended in attempted
recovery of property preferentially transferred by the debtor is equal to the
value of the property actually recovered, 170 the Chandler Bill appears on
sound ground in attempting to strengthen the preference provisions. 7  Since
the critical period is longer than four months, 178 it would seem advisable to
lengthen the preference period and to provide that any transfer or debt con-
tracted within that period is prima facie preferential. 79 It might be prudent
to provide for the appointment of an official auditor to aid in discovering
preferences and for an inventory at the beginning of each case. Larger divi-
dends can also be realized by giving the trustee more adequate remedies.
While the Chandler Bill vests bankruptcy courts with summary jurisdiction
in proceedings to set aside a preferential lien,' 80 and requires an assignee or
receiver to account,' 8 ' summary jurisdiction or even plenary jurisdiction
might have been given to bankruptcy courts in a wider area.'8 2 Provision for
summary judgments against debtors of the estate who admit their obliga-
tions, moreover, would assist in the collection of accounts receivable.18 3 On
the other hand, in order to guard against indiscriminate seizure in involuntary
proceedings of the property of a debtor who may never be adjudicated, the




176. Kreft, What is the "Subject of Bankruptcies?" (1932) 6 TEzip. L. Q. 141. 160.
177. For a discussion of important amendments to the preference and fraudulent
conveyance sections, see McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 374, 384.
178. Fiirth, supra note 8, at 859.
179. Deutsch, The Bankruptcy Law and Practice (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 311, 317.
The English Act voids gifts made within 10 years before bankruptcy if the debtor was
unable to pay all his debts at the time of the gift. (1900) 109 L. T. 119. See also,
DoNovAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156 (claims of close relatives subordinated).
180. §67a(4).
181. § 2(21).
182. See Committee Print, spra note 6, at 134; Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at
608, 609, 610; Hunt, National Bankruptcy Legislation-Past, Present and Future (1933)
38 Comm. L. J. 630, 639.
183. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 133. But cf. Joint
Hearings, supra note 11, at 688. It has been further suggested that the provision [car-
ried in the act of 1800] of an allowance of support out of the estate to the debtor
during liquidation would assist in greater realization, since the debtor, freed from the
necessity of attempting to earn a living during liquidation, would be more willing and
able to cooperate. Indeed, it is said that such a provision would decrease fraudulent
bankruptcies by making it unnecessary for the debtor to put something aside in order
to support himself. Hunt, supra note 182, at 641.
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ed only where necessary. 8 4 In large cities, at least, a receiver must be ap-
pointed in every case, because of the danger that the estate will be eaten up
by rent, watchmen service, insurance and other expenses, or that the debtor
will dissipate his estate unless the assets are disposed of before the election
of a trustee.18s
Dividends to general creditors can also be increased by more even distri-
bution of total dividends, for the priorities allowed various groups of credit-
ors consume a large proportion of assets realized. 8 0 The Chandler Bill limits
priorities to those mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act by eliminating the pro-
vision allowing priorities established by states, except rent for the three
months preceding bankruptcy.8' Since many leases contain acceleration
clauses, a disproportionate amount of assets is often consumed, especially in
small cases, by rent claims.' s s
It has been thought also that if discharges were denied more frequently,
future earnings would be made available to creditors and realization thereby
increased. While the indiscriminate granting of discharges has been attribut-
ed in large part to inadequacy of investigation and lack of opposition, matters
left to creditor initiative, discharges have probably been given freely because
of the few grounds upon which they can be denied.180 The Chandler Bill
seeks to insure adequate examination of a debtor by providing for compul-
sory examination, 90 for the filing of a statement of affairs,' 0 ' and for investi-
gations by the United States attorney upon court request; it guarantees oppo-
184. § 2a(3).
185. Clark, supra note 129, at 1196.
186. Hunt, supra note 182, at 641. A large proportion of assets are of course con-
sumed by exemptions. Various suggestions have been advanced to supersede the present
system of leaving exemptions to state control. § 6a. Poteat, Debtors' Exemptions-A
Study in Credit Administration (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library,
1933), 49 (system of joint federal-state control); Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at
270 (maximum limitation on state exemptions); Siegel, Suggestions for the In proe-
ment of the Bankruptcy System (1924) 1 Am. BANKs. Ra,. 69 (federal control of
exemptions). It would seem wise to retain large exemptions if debtors are to be given
proper relief. See p. 1210 infra. For a discussion of the homestead exemptions, see
Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1023. The exemption statutes are collected in C. C. H.
BAxKs. SV. 1 7101.
187. § 64a(5). See also § 67c, making a similar provision with respect to liens and
guarding against thwarting of the priorities set up in the act by state statutes mating
certain claims liens.
188. Even in the absence of priorities, claims for future rent generally constituted
such a large proportion of total liabilities that they vere originally not provable. A
recent amendment made them provable for one year. §63a(7). The Chandler Bill
re-enacts this provision but supplements it with a provision making rent claims fully
dischargeable. § 17a. See Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. S94.
189. STRENGTHENING OF PRCDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3. Discharges are
granted to 98% of applicants in mercantile cases and to 991,-% in non-mercantile cases.
Id. at 12. For a history of discharge provisions, see id. at 11; articles cited supra
note 2.
190. § 55b. See STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93.
191. § 7a(9).
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sition when warranted by vesting the trustee and the United States attorney
with power to contest a discharge without creditor consent, and by providing
that adjudication operate as an automatic application for discharge.10 2 These
changes will have no serious effect and the Bill does not adopt the oft-ad-
vanced suggestions that provision be made for suspending discharge and for
broadening the grounds on which discharges must be denied.' 0 3
The policy of the Chandler Bill toward discharge appears sound since
experience has shown that severe discharge and examination provisions do
not achieve their stated aims: the exclusion of bankrupts from trade, the
prevention of failure by discouraging extravagance and dishonesty. and the
increasing of dividends to creditors in a particular case. 0 4 Certainly the
threat of a denied discharge would seem no more likely to prevent failure than
the danger of imprisonment for debt; for the assumption that a potential bank-
rupt carefully weighs the possibilities of success against the penalties of fail-
ure before making a contemplated move and will take longer chances if a
discharge can be easily obtained, is at best of questionable validity.' 0 5 And
although somewhat bothersome to a wage earner, denial of a discharge is
little more than an inconvenience to a business man since he may return to
business by incorporating or by acting in the name of a dummy. 00 Since the
only benefit to be gained from tighter discharge is a speculative slight in-
crease in dividends in wage earner cases, it seems undesirable to adopt meas-
ures whose only effect would be to reduce the standard of living of wage
earners, and to lower the morale of other debtors by forcing them to circum-
vent a denied discharge. 1
97
192. § 14. The last provision will also guard against inadvertent omission to apply
for a discharge. In many cases discharges are not applied for because of ignorance of
the necessity for an application. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 204.
193. STRENGTHENING OF PROcEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96; Douglas and Mar-
shall, supra note 51, at 31 et seq.; Radin, Discharge in Bankruptcy (1931) 9 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 39. The Chandler Bill provides that confirmation of an arrangement within
6 years, as well as a previous discharge, is a bar to obtaining a discharge [§ 14c(5) ],
and that title to property vested in the bankrupt by inheritance within six months after
bankruptcy is given to the trustee. § 70a(7).
194. The aims of a rigorous discharge provision have never been clearly formulated.
See Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 668: "Personally I believe we ought to jail some
of these bankrupts, because I think they are like thugs . . . we do not punish them
enough."
195. Compare the theory of punishment as a deterrent to crime. Von Hurtig,
Punishment (1934) 5 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENcEs 712. See also Radin, supra note 193, at
43. See Radin, Debt (1934) 5 ENccYc. Soc. SCIENCEs 32. And see the figures as to
the percentage of "repeaters" in England and the United States in Douglas, Some
Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 329, 361.
196. See Joint Hearings, mpra note 11, at 618. No effective check on these practices
has been adopted in England. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from the
Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, March 1, 1937.
197. There are about 80,000 undischarged bankrupts in England. See Noel, The
Pankruph., Law as it Affects Credit (1925) 13 GEORGETOWN L. J. 131, 140. The original
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Conclusion. Even if the Chandler Bill accomplished all the objectives of
its sponsors, it would still leave virtually untouched the problem of prevent-
ing insolvencies' 9 - a problem intensified by the recent addition, with the
development of mass credit to implement a system of mass production, of a
host of consumer insolvencies to the already vast number of business fail-
ures. 99 Failure results from the operation or interaction of two broad caus-
es: an improper extension of credit when it was reasonable to foresee that
the credit advance could not be repaid: and the impact (if "accidental" factors
not reasonably predictable at the time of credit extension. - i0 To remove
these causes measures more fundamental than amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act are necessary.
An attempt may be made to curb improper credit extension by wider dis-
semination of credit information through increased creditor cooperation or
governmental regulation.2 0' These efforts do not promise significant success,
however, because in a competitive system creditors can not be induced to
extend credit only when warranted, -2 02 even if the added legislative sanction of
priority in collection and bankruptcy proceedings according to the date of
extension of credit is imposed,20 3 or if collection remedies are otherwise cur-
tailed. To limit failures effectively inferior credit risks must be eliminated so
that credit granting, even if indiscriminate, will be made safer.
While some poor risks can be taken care of by education and creditor or
governmental supervision,2 -0 4 the bulk of inferior risks can only be weeded
policy of discharge, in part at least, was to encourage business expansion. Douglas,
supra note 2. at 449.
198. Sturges and Cooper, su pra note 72. at 496. 497.
199. From 1920-1930 wage earner bankruptcies increased 414% while the p)pulation
increased 16%. CAUSES oF DAxKR, cy A.8toxG Co.,suams, op. cit. supra note 72,
at 1. See Symposium on Instalment Credit in 1935) 2 L~w & Co.,TEMsP. Pron. 139;
references cited in Nehemkis, supra note 94, at 561, n. 1.
200. For discussion of the causes of bankruptcy, see Cusms oF BA:NMUnt, rcv Amoxm
Coust-m s, loc. cit. supra note 72; DFr'r oF CoMMEncE, CAUsEs oF CommEr.cA BAn-
RUPTcIEs, (Dom. Commerce Series, No. 69) (1932); DEPT OF CONM E2E, CAUsES OF
Busi Fss FAILURES AND BANKRUPTCIES OF INDIVIDUALs IN NEW JEnSEY IN 1929-30
(Dom. Commerce Series, No. 54) (1931): Cover, loc. cit. supra note 42; Douglas,
Some Functional Aspects of Banknptcy (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 329.
201. For various suggestions, see (1924) 1 Am. BANIX. Ruv. 179; (1925) 2 Ai.
BANxKR Ra'. 136.
202. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1936, p. 2, col. 2: "They (retail druggists)
were informed by their president, George Gottesman, that close to 70% of their num-
ber were actually insolvent and were staying in business only on the sufferance of
drug manufacturers and wholesalers." See also, CAuses or ComtEnCIAL BAnnn='-rCEs,
supra note 200, at 6.
203. See Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act (1934) 43 YALE L J. 1055.
The scheme suggested seems worth adopting for whatever effect it may have on the
prevention of failure, since the system of distribution proposed is decidedly more equit-
able than the present method.
204. As a result of the suggestions made by the Department of Commerce after
a sirvey of Louisville grocers, failure among that group was reduced considerably.
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out by limiting entry into business to those who are both efficient and ade-
quately capitalized 20 5 and by licensing consumption credit - measures which,
even if enforceable, are accompanied by consequences in social stratification
and consumption limitation, so undesirable as to overbalance the possible
monetary saving that their adoption might effect. Failures which result from
improper credit extension, moreover, can probably never be completely wiped
out in a competitive economy; for even "efficient" businesses must fail in
such a system, and goods must be sold to some who are unable to pay in
a system of unplanned production.
20 6
Though the immediate social and economic effect of failure on debtor,
creditor and consumer is often disastrous, 20 7 it may be questioned whether
it is sound social policy to make any attempt to cut down those failures which
result from improper credit extension. Since credit can be extended more
discriminatingly only at the risk of refusing credit to a large proportion of non-
delinquent consumers along with the delinquent, it will be difficult, even under
a centrally controlled system of credit, to approach closer to the point where
credit policies make for a maximum excess of saving in production costs over
bad debt losses.20 8 And if the possibilities of monetary gain are so slight, it
Sadd, Department of Commerce Studies the Causes of Business Failures (1931) 5
J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 135. As to creditor cooperation, see Cover, supra note 42, at 97.
205. Cf. King, Salient Features of the Bankruptcy Laws of Other Countries (1931)
9 J. N. A. REF. BANxR. 75, 78. More failures result from inefficient business methods
and practices than from any other cause. CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURE AND BANK-
RUPTcIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN NEw JERSEY IN 1929-30, supra note 200, at 1.
206. See CAUSES OF CoMEacIAL BANKRUPTCY, supra note 200, at 6. Even under
a system of planned production, estimates can never attain precise accuracy.
207, The repercussions of failure on debtor and creditor go deeper than immediate
monetary losses. CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURE AND BANKRUPTCIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN
NEW JERSEY IN 1929-30, supra note 200, at iv. To the insolvent, whether business man
or wage earner, failure often results in loss of employment and an unbearable debt
burden as well as lowered morale and broken social ties. CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES
AMONG CONSUMERS, supra note 200, at 8. Cover, Liquidation and Rehabilitation of the
Consumer and Small Business (1933) 36 SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 444. To the creditor
the failure of his customer may well sound his own business death knell. STRENGTHEN-
ING OF PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9. To competitors of the debtor failure
sometimes manifests itself in a demoralized market for their wares. CAUSES OF Com-
MERCIAL BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 200, at 9. The costs of failure are ultimately borne
by the consumer. For varying estimates of their magnitude, see Radin, supra note 193,
at 39; Davidson, Impressions of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Law (1932) 37 CoMM.
L. J. 241, 243; STREbiGTHENING OF PROCEDURE, supra at 1.
208. To reach this optimum synchronization is the aim of every well-managed
business, and not all businesses are so managed. See CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES AT, ONG
CONSUMERS, supra note 72, at 11; see note 205, supra. For an estimate of the percentage
bad debt losses .form of total sales, see Coles, The Bankruptcy Law and Its Amendment
(1931) 36 Comm. L. J. 317. Costs of collection must be added to any such figure.
See SCHMALz (1928) OPERATING STATISTICS FOR CREDIT AND ACCOUNTS RECEIVADLE
DEPARTMENT OF RETAIL STORES in 1 MICH. Bus. STUDIES, No. 6 (1927).
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would seem impolitic to risk disturbing a societal structure bound closely
to the credit system; for the elimination of consumer insolvencies can be
accomplished only at the cost of reducing production and thus adding more
productive workers to the ranks of the unemployed-ranks which vill be
further swelled by the incompetent business men and their employees who
are excluded from trade in order to reduce business failures.23 It may be,
moreover, that through the mechanism of failure capitalism provides sup-
port for those who would otherwise be unemployed or who are employed at
inadequate wages. And while this crude device imposes the burden of sup-
port on those least able to bear it through what amounts to a gigantic sales
tax, the proceeds of which are unscientifically distributed according to the
whim of merchants and manufacturers, it may be necessary to tolerate failure
until it becomes practicable by the adoption of more fundamental measures
to place the burden on those best able to bear it, and to distribute the benefits
more equitably.
Even when credit is extended only to those who would be regarded as good
risks initially, circumstances which could not readily be foreseen may operate
by increasing a debtor's expenses or decreasing his income to cause failures.
Over some factors-automobile accident judgments, extraordinary medical
expenses, unemployment, or excessive interest rates on loans incurred to
tide over such emergencies-the debtor can exercise little influence; over
others--speculation, gambling and dishonesty-his control is more direct.
Some measures--compulsory insurance, socialized medicine, unemployment
insurance, and governmental loans-aimed at eliminating or lessening the
shock of the former eventualities, give more promise of at least a partial
success than those-government control of real estate development and stock
speculation and punishment of dishonesty-directed at limiting the impact of
the latter forces.2 10 Since elimination of these causes of failure involves cop-
ing with many of society's major problems, the effect of a suggested proposal
in reducing insolvencies should not induce its adoption if it is otherwise un-
desirable. Nor is there any compelling force to the suggestions that the bank-
ruptcy power be given to the states because they alone are able to deal with
the social problems antecedent to bankruptcy,"1 ' since the solution of those
problems in no way hinges on where the bankruptcy power resides.
Like other bankruptcy legislation the Chandler Bill must be judged, how-
ever, not by its effect in reducing failures, but by its success in cutting down
209. Cf. Radin, supra note 193, at 47. See Radin, Debt (1931) 5 Eucyc. Soc.
ScIE-cas 32, 38. Some of this group would probably be directly re-employed by those
establishments which received the trade of the defunct businesses.
210. Cover, supra note 42, at 30. Douglas, mpra note 72, passim and at 642; Hanil-
ton, In re The Sinall Debtor (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 473. Attempts to solve these
problems through use of the discharge provisions [Douglas, Ioc. cit. supra note 200;
(1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 440] are doomed to failure. See p. 1206 sspra.
211. Douglas, supra note 72, at 638 et seq.
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losses in other ways. The Bill ignores for the most part the possibility of
increasing dividends through improving the standard bankruptcy machinery
and concentrates on providing special proceedings which are expected to
decrease credit losses by shortening the critical period, by realizing more on
assets at a minimum expense and by tapping future earnings. Although the
Chandler Bill is probably calculated to achieve these objectives in wage earner
cases, it is doubtful whether it will be similarly successful in commercial
cases unless the suggested provisions for strengthening the position of as-
signments and of common law compositions are adopted.
212
The increased dividends that creditors will in all likelihood receive through
the operation of the Chandler Bill, or at least those dividends obtained by
resort to a wage earner's future earnings, may, however, be secured at too
high a price in debtor suffering. And while the couching of fundamentally
creditor measures in terms of debtor relief213 does not in itself vitiate that
relief, a debtor, if his problems are to be adequately cared for, must not only
be discharged from his personal obligations and relieved from the stigma
of bankruptcy 214 but must also be assisted as far as is constitutionally pos-
sible in retaining his home, his farm, or his business assets, even though they
are subject to mortgages. In view of the role of failure in a competitive
economy, the paramount purpose of the Bankruptcy Act should be to pro-
vide such thoroughgoing relief for debtors.
212. The success of the bill and of the suggestions advanced in this respect will
of course ultimately depend on whether these proceedings carry a lesser stigma than
bankruptcy. See notes 125, 126 supra and note 214 infra.
213. A debtor-creditor dichotomy has its limitations. Legislation passed in the
interest of creditors often results in debtor relief. Imprisonment for debt was abolished
because it was uneconomic, not because it was inhumanitarian. See Noel, supra note
197, at 137. Discharge was adopted to induce debtors to turn over their assets, not
for purposes of debtor relief. McLaughlin, supra note 3 at 352. For an intelligent
discussion of the problem, see Poteat, Debtors' Exemptions: A Study in Credit Admil-
istration (Unpublished Manuscript in the Yale Law Library, 1933). The Chandler
Bill seems to have been proposed primarily from the viewpoint of credit interests. See
statement by W. Randolph Montgomery in (1935) 9 J. N. A. REF. BANxit, 64:
"During the next session of Congress, I presume that the results of the Bankruptcy
Conference will be introduced. I do not know that that is wise at the present time.
Personally I am fearful of the debtor psychology that is abroad at the present time."
214. See Joint Hearings, supra note 11, at 893.
[Vol. 46 : 11771210
